



# SECURING PRIVILEGED ACCESS ON-PREMISES AND IN THE CLOUD

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# ABOUT ME – THOMAS KURTH



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# SECURING ON-PREMISES PRIVILEGED ACCESS



# WHY HAVE THIS CONVERSATION?


- ▶ Active Directory (AD) is the gate to most IT assets in most large enterprises
- ▶ Privilege escalation in AD is the path to persistence and control in the enterprise
- ▶ Taking steps to make the adversary's job much harder are critical in today's world
- ▶ Organizations must manage AD as a security asset, not just as infrastructure

# TIERED ACCESS MODEL: RISK CONTAINMENT

TIER


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CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENT





1

APPS, DATA, & SERVERS



2

USERS & DEVICES



- ▶ Tiering of privileged credentials isolates privilege and risk
- ▶ Technical controls prevent a credential from being exposed to a lower assurance system
- ▶ The ability for an adversary to move laterally and escalate is dramatically reduced



Logon & Control Paths

# AD PRIVILEGED ACCESS ESSENTIALS

- ✓ Minimize Tier 0 identities (Domain Admins, etc.)
- ✓ Separate privileged user accounts
- ✓ Prevent Tier 0 exposure to lower tiers
- ✓ Address Tier 0 equivalencies
- ✓ Prevent lateral movement

# SEGMENTING TIER 1 AND TIER 2



- ▶ Tier 1 may be a complex undertaking
- ▶ Place new / lifecycled apps into Tier 1
- ▶ Remediate high risk apps




- ▶ Tier 2 should be relatively easy to tackle
- ▶ Interactions between systems should be limited
- ▶ Separation of agents may be complicated



# JUST-IN-TIME ACCESS

- ▶ Privileged credentials are isolated in a hardened, isolated administrative forest
- ▶ Access is granted to privileged credentials on a time-bound basis after two-factor authentication



# ACTIVE DIRECTORY AND JIT

- ▶ Windows Server 2016 introduces a new optional feature called "Privileged Identity Management" (PIM)

## Time Bound Linked Attributes


- ▶ Linked attributes can now have an optional time-to-live
- ▶ Domain controllers automatically remove linked attribute values at expiry
- ▶ Kerberos TGTs expire based on the shortest group membership lifetime

## PIM Trusts


- ▶ New trust flag for external trusts
- ▶ Modifies the behavior of SID Filtering
- ▶ Allows SIDs from the trusting domain to be included in tokens issued by the trusted domain
- ▶ Backported to Windows Server 2012 R2 in a update rollup

# MIM JUST-IN-TIME ACCESS ARCHITECTURE


## Administrative Forest



## Protected Forest(s)




## Protected Forest




1-Way Trust  
"Protected" trusts  
"Privileged"

## Administrative Forest



# CLEAN SOURCE PRINCIPLE




- ▶ If "System C" is AD, then all upstream control paths must operate at the same level of assurance
- ▶ This extends to agents and management tools
- ▶ Clean Source also creates the need for privileged access workstations (PAWs)

# PRIVILEGED ACCESS WORKSTATIONS: A CLEAN SOURCE FOR IT TASKS

- ▶ Privileged Access Workstations (PAWs) provide a known-good, clean keyboard for performing privileged or sensitive tasks.
- ▶ PAWs isolate sensitive accounts and processes from the risk of a potentially compromised workstation
- ▶ Isolation is achieved by ensuring that the PAW is built from clean media and prevented from accessing threat vectors such as the Internet
  - ▶ Internet filtering typically excludes trusted sites (e.g. cloud management portals)

# MICROSOFT SECURITY CONFIGURATION FRAMEWORK

- ▶ <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/04/11/introducing-the-security-configuration-framework-a-prioritized-guide-to-hardening-windows-10/>



# STANDALONE PAW




PAW Laptop



Productivity Laptop

# CONSOLIDATED PAW + PRODUCTIVITY VM




PAW Host Laptop




# HARDENED VDI CLIENT



PAW Laptop



# SHIELDED VM PAW HOST



<https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/datacentersecurity/2018/04/30/paw-deployment-guide>


# PAW PROJECT COMPLEXITIES: NOT JUST THE IMAGE

## The clean source principle must be pervasive in your design


- ▶ **Supply Chain** – new-in-box hardware that is only touched by trusted individuals
- ▶ **Provisioning** – PAWs built in “clean rooms” with limited access
- ▶ **Networking** – dedicated VPN tunnels for PAWs that should be “always-on”
- ▶ **Management Tools** – trusted tooling for endpoint management, vulnerability management, etc.
- ▶ **End User Support** – managing hardware issues, rebuilds, etc.

# TIER 0 FOREST: STRONG CREDENTIAL PROTECTION

- ▶ Admin forests separate highly privileged credentials into a secure, isolated AD forest
- ▶ Privileged credentials are removed from protected forests, dramatically reducing the ability for an adversary to gain control of a protected AD forest
- ▶ Administration should be performed exclusively from a clean source, PAWs



# PRIVILEGED ACCESS PROTECTION: COMPLEXITY VS REWARD



# PRIVILEGED ACCESS IN THE CLOUD



# PERMISSION TYPES IN THE CLOUD

## SaaS

- ▶ Role based in Azure AD
  - ▶ No assignment by group possible
  - ▶ Azure AD PIM support
- ▶ SaaS Applications
  - ▶ Sometimes by Azure AD Roles
  - ▶ Own implementations

## IaaS / PaaS

- ▶ Access Control IAM
- ▶ Azure AD PIM support

The Domain Admin disaster happens again with  
Global Admin permissions!



# The different permission types



# AZURE AD ROLES WITH AAD GROUPS

- ▶ Azure Automation to simplify role assignment
- ▶ Existing IAM solutions can be leveraged
- ▶ Keep in mind permission changes require new token (Logoff/logon)
  
- ▶ Step by Step  
<https://blog.basevision.ch/2019/05/assign-azuread-o365-roles-based-on-groups/>
- ▶ Script  
<https://github.com/ThomasKur/ModernAndSecureWorkplace/tree/master/AzureADGroupBasedRoles>



# Automating role management in the cloud

# AZURE AD PRIVILEGED ACCESS MANAGEMENT

- ▶ O365
  - ▶ Request Options
    - ▶ MFA
    - ▶ Ticket Number
    - ▶ Approval
  - ▶ Activation Times O365
    - ▶ Logoff and Logon required
    - ▶ Since 1901 super fast also for Exchange Online
  - ▶ Effect on Conditional Access rules
    - ▶ When Role is Active it will detect it



# Configure Azure AD PIM

## O365

# AZURE AD PRIVILEGE ACCESS MANAGEMENT

- ▶ Azure IaaS
  - ▶ Effective permissions based on scope and role and identity
  - ▶ PIM types
    - ▶ Active (like Permanent in O365 roles)
    - ▶ Eligible
  - ▶ "Permanent" is used for the assignment
  - ▶ Eligible duration per default not permanent possible

Membership settings

Assignment type  
Eligible

Maximum allowed eligible duration is permanent.

Permanently eligible

\* Assignment starts  
2019-03-17 20:40:42

\* Assignment ends  
2019-06-15 21:40:42



# Configure Azure AD PIM Azure IaaS

# VM JUST-IN-TIME ACCESS

- ▶ Reduce attack surface of Virtual Machines
- ▶ Based on
  - ▶ Network Access Rules
  - ▶ RDP, SSH, Remote PowerShell and more
- ▶ Configuration possibilities
  - ▶ Azure Security Center
  - ▶ VM Configuration

## Just-in-time access

To improve security, enable a just-in-time access policy. ⓘ

[Upgrade your Security Center subscription to enable a just-in-time access policy](#)

## Azure hybrid benefit

Use existing Windows license ⓘ

No

Yes



# How to enable VM JIT



# Extended Q&A



